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Late Egyptian counterfactual conditionals and 
counterfactual reasoning
Mark Collier
It is a distinct pleasure to offer a contribution to 
celebrate John and his work. I hope he will find the 
following exploration of reasoning with counterfactual 
conditionals in Late Egyptian of some interest; I would 
like to think that, albeit from a rather different direc-
tion, it complements some of John’s own work, such 
as his engagement with Berlin and Kay’s discussion 
of colour terms in relation to the empirical evidence 
surviving from ancient Egypt. In deference to John’s 
known views, I avoid footnotes, and, for this reason, 
I have restricted the referencing and bibliography in 
ways I doubt I would ordinarily have been able to force 
myself to do, though I wonder whether he will be as 
content with that.
In discussing Late Egyptian counterfactual condi-
tionals and how they are used in counterfactual 
reasoning, I will be looking in more detail at the steps 
in understanding these conditionals than is usual in 
Egyptology. In so doing I will be drawing on investi-
gations of reasoning associated with counterfactual 
conditionals from psychology, on modelling of condi-
tional use in cognitive science, as well as on discussions 
of cross-linguistic properties of conditionals. I am 
particularly interested in the unstated but implicated 
elements of the reasoning processes (inferences), since 
these provide significant comment on ancient cogni-
tive processing of such conditionals. In particular, in 
these domains at least, the evidence would seem to 
suggest that ancient Egyptian reasoners utilized the 
same (unconscious) rational, cognitive reasoning 
processes which have been investigated for modern 
(principally western) reasoners (or, at least, an ancient 
Egyptian reasoner can be successfully and satisfyingly 
read through modelling with these attributes). As such, 
I am here investigating what the psychologist Ruth 
Byrne (2005) has termed the ‘rational imagination’ as 
attested from ancient Egypt, some 3,000 years ago.
1 h-n conditionals
Conditionals introduced with h-n provide the canon-
ical examples of past counterfactual conditionals in 
Late Egyptian.
Example 1 Wenamun, 2, 28–32
In The Report of Wenamun, Tjekerbaal has provided 
evidence from records that previous rulers of Egypt 
paid for the timber for the bark of Amun-Re, since, 
he notes, they did not have direct control over Byblos, 
and Tjekerbaal is also himself not the servant of Egypt’s 
temporal rulers. Wenamun responds by rebuilding his 
case directly around the god Amun/Amun-Re. After 
an initial discussion of Amun’s universal sway and how 
the god’s travelling image has been neglected by Tjek-
erbaal, Wenamun directly exploits Tjekerbaal’s argu-
ment to reconfigure his own:
ir pAy=k Dd wn nA nsy HAwty dit in.tw HD nbw, h-n wn 
(m)-di=w anx snb, wn bn iw=w dit in.tw nA (A)xt; i-ir=w dit 
in.tw nA Axt (r-)DbA anx snb (n) nAy=k it(y).
xr ir imn-ra nsw nTrw, mntf pA nb n pA anx snb; xr mntf pA nb 
n nAy=k ity. iry=w pAy=w aHa n anx iw=w wdn n imn. mntk 
m-ra mntk bAk n imn
‘As for your saying that previous kings used to have silver and 
gold sent, if they had had life and health, they would not have 
had these things [silver and gold] sent; they did send these 
things – but only instead of life and health – to your ancestors.
Now, as for Amun-Re king of the gods, he is the master of life 
and health and he is the master of your ancestors. They spent 
their lifetime offering to Amun. You too, you are a servant 
of Amun.’
Counterfactual conditionals are not ordinarily used 
simply to imagine alternative states of affairs in and 
for themselves nor to explore those imagined states of 
affairs in detail (‘counterfactuality’, as it were). Rather, 
they are used, through the imagining of alternatives, 
to augment discussion and understanding of states 
of affairs as they actually are or, at least, as they are 
presented or taken to be by the user of the conditional 
(‘factuality’, if I may coin a rather infelicitous term), 
and draw directly on those actual states of affairs as a 
base for understanding the counterfactual.
So, in example 1, central elements are directly inher-
ited from ‘factuality’, at least as Wenamun re-presents 
Tjekerbaal’s point: here the participants (previous kings 
of Egypt and previous rulers of Byblos) and the situa-
tion of obtaining timber for the bark of Amun-Re are 
inherited directly. That is, although the counterfactual 
may be partitioned from the surrounding context in its 
counterfactuality, it is grounded in and inherits struc-
ture and information from that context (cf. Fauconnier 
1997: 14–18). As such, much of the ‘factuality’ (things 
as they are or as presented or taken to be) is accepted 
into, and/or is recoverable from (cf. Byrne 2005: 11), the 
counterfactual conditional.
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It is in one key area that the counterfactual ante-
cedent in example 1 explicitly differs from factuality. 
The counterfactual alteration is, of course, that in the 
imagined situation, and contrary to (f)actuality as 
presented, (relevant recent) previous Egyptian kings 
are imagined as controlling life and health, and it is the 
imagined outcome of this alteration which is posited in 
the counterfactual consequent: that in such an imag-
ined situation previous kings of Egypt would not have 
had to pay for the timber through sending silver and 
gold. As with the use of counterfactual conditionals in 
well-studied languages, there is no attempt to flesh out 
this counterfactual state of affairs beyond the imme-
diate need (for example by investigating how the conse-
quences of this altered vision of Egyptian kings having 
direct control or influence over Byblos would have 
radiated out over and altered the historical time-line in 
numerous ways); the purpose of the imagined situation 
is to enrich understanding of the current (f)actual state 
of affairs under discussion.
Reasoning with counterfactual conditionals also 
involves what I shall term an implicated obverse, a prag-
matically implicated direct alternate to the conditional 
as actually stated, its direct obverse (which is thus the 
corresponding assumed factual situation), which is 
borne in mind by human reasoners (cf. Byrne 2005: 
30–36). In this case, the obverse involves the direct 
negation of both the antecedent and the consequent of 
the conditional, and I shall term this the implicated full 
obverse. That is, in reasoning with the counterfactual 
conditional:
– counterfac: [previous rulers control 
life and health]
> [rulers not send 
silver and gold]
the following obverse (assumed-to-be) factual relation-
ship is implicated:
– implic f-o: [previous rulers not 
control life and health]
> [rulers send 
silver and gold]
This implicated obverse is closely analogous, of course, 
to the position put forward by Tjekerbaal, but crucially 
is augmented through the feature of [- control life and 
health], and thus takes on Tjekerbaal’s point but builds 
upon it by explicitly introducing the issue of control-
ling life and health into the argument and linking it in a 
conditional relationship with the issue of sending silver 
and gold.
In this way the counterfactual conditional and its 
implicated full obverse provide an enriched context for 
Wenamun to work with. Through the counterfactual 
conditional and its implicated obverse Wenamun has 
put forward the point that controlling life and health 
(power) and sending silver and gold (payment) are 
alternate means for being able to secure timber for 
the bark of Amun-Re, but alternate means with a clear 
scalar ranking: controlling life and health is presented 
as a higher option in this context (for the Egyptians and 
for Wenamun), whereas payment is a lower option only 
activated should there be a failure to control life and 
health. This allows Wenamun to develop his argument 
further first in relation to previous kings and then by 
turning to the god.
For the case of previous kings, Wenamun’s argu-
ment draws on the implicated full obverse factual posi-
tion that previous kings not controlling life and health 
would result in them sending silver and gold. He makes 
it expressly clear in the immediately following second-
tense construction that his point is that such payment 
was sent instead of life and health, and thus as the lower 
option they were restricted to.
The stated counterfactual conditional provides the 
direct frame in which Wenamun articulates his argu-
ment centred on the god Amun-Re. Wenamun has 
already asserted the universal sway of the god (as Amun) 
and now specifically asserts that Amun-Re controls life 
and health and is the master of Tjekerbaal and his ances-
tors. If one accepts and follows the reasoning process, 
the inescapable conclusion is that Amun/Amun-Re 
should not pay for the timber; yet, and this is something 
of particular note, this conclusion is not explicitly stated 
in the text, though it is the consequence that a rational 
agent following the reasoning process would infer 
Wenamun to be implying, and it is surely one which any 
successful reading of this passage, whether ancient or 
modern, requires. The steps in reasoning are:
– counterfac: previous 
kings
[+ control life 
and health]
> not send silver 
and gold
– (implicated f-o: previous 
kings
[- control life 
and health]
> send silver 
and gold)
– statement: Amun-Re [+ control life 
and health]
– replacement: Amun-Re [+ control life 
and health] 
> not send silver 
and gold
– inference: Amun-Re not send silver 
and gold
An important step in reasoning to the concluding 
inference is that Amun-Re is a suitable replacement for 
previous kings in the original frame linking possession 
of life and health with not having to send silver and gold. 
That is, there are a series of counterpart relationships 
here. In the original counterfactual conditional and in 
Wenamun’s immediate follow-up to the conditional, 
‘previous kings’ are projected through real and coun-
terfactual space with the same referent (counterpart 
Mark Collier
16 The written world: word, text, language
replication), whereas once Wenamun has established 
that Amun-Re meets the matching conditions for the 
role of ‘previous kings’ in the original counterfactual 
conditional (as the master of life and health; Amun-Re 
is also explicitly characterized as ‘king of the gods’), 
this makes ‘Amun-Re’ eligible as a counterpart (coun-
terpart replacement: Amun-Re is matched as a coun-
terpart and can replace the original ‘previous kings’). 
There is again a scalar component to this as well in that 
the god is clearly presented as a more powerful figure 
than previous kings and so what should be applicable 
to them (control life and health > not pay) should all 
the more be applicable to the god. Of course, since 
the god is asserted to control life and health in actu-
ality, then the replacement frame with Amun-Re in the 
antecedent is not counterfactual, but factual (if/since 
Amun-Re [+ control life and health] > not pay silver 
and gold), and so, therefore, is its consequent.
Once this replacement is made, then, in conjunc-
tion with the assertion of Amun-Re [+ control life and 
health], we have standard modus ponens reasoning, 
allowing the straightforward rational inference of 
[Amun-Re not send silver and gold]. So Wenamun 
utilizes the frame of the counterfactual with replace-
ment of Amun-Re for previous kings to generate an 
implicated (but unstated) outcome that Amun-Re 
should not have to pay for the timber for his bark, thus 
concluding his movement from Tjekerbaal’s demon-
stration that previous rulers paid for the acquisition of 
timber to his own case that the god should not have to 
pay. A visual summary is given in Figure 1.
In the end, of course, all this sets the scene for Wena-
mun’s ultimate compromise, which is to recognize that 
he must seek financial resource from Egypt to pay 
Tjekerbaal (the secular frame, as it were), and thus that 
Tjekerbaal will derive direct financial benefit from the 
transaction (Wenamun, 2, 34–37), but that this should 
run parallel to the sacral frame of the divine authority 
of Amun, and that in terms of this frame Tjekerbaal 
is operating as a proper servant of the god and he will 
derive the broader benefits of well-being and health 
and good rule (Wenamun, 2, 32–33).
The second example also comes from Wenamun. 
Having gone into example 1 in detail, I can be brief here:
Example 2 Wenamun, 1, 17–21
Wenamun has reached the town of Dor. There, a man 
from his ship has fled taking with him Wenamun’s 
valuables. Wenamun goes to Bador, the prince of Dor, 
and says that he has been robbed in Bador’s harbour 
and asks him to search for his money. He then says that 
the money belongs to (is the responsibility of) a host of 
individuals including Bador. Bador’s response includes 
the following direct comment on this:
xr pt(r)i bw ir=i am n tAy wSbt i-Dd=k. h-n iTAy iw n-sw pAy=i 
tA pA hAy r tAy=k b-r, mtw=f TAy pAy=k HD, wn iw=i DbA=f n=k 
m pAy=i wDA, SAa.tw=w gm pAy=k iTAy n rn=f. yA ir pA iTAy 
i-TAy tw, mntk sw, n-sw tAy=k b-r. i-ir nhy hrw dy (r)-qAi-n=i, 
wxA=i sw
‘Now, look, I don’t understand this response you’ve given. If 
it had been a thief belonging to my land who had boarded 
your ship and stolen your money, I would compensate you 
from my own storehouse, until your thief had been found, 
whoever he is. In fact, the thief who robbed you, he is one of 
yours, he’s from your own ship. Spend a few days with me, so 
I can look for him.’
The counterfactual situation accepts the theft but 
imagines, contrary to fact (as presented by Bador), 
that the thief belonged to Bador’s land (and thus falls 
under Bador’s responsibility). In Bador’s stated view, 
this would lead Bador to compensate Wenamun for 
the loss. The implicated full obverse is then: [thief 
who stole your money not belong to my land] > [I not 
compensate you]. Once again, as with the first example, 
adding in an extra ingredient in the counterfactual 
conditional (this time considering the specific case of 
the thief who stole the money as belonging to Bador’s 
land and then following through the consequences) 
allows Bador to follow up either or both the stated situ-
ation (a counterfactual conditional) and its implicated 
obverse (equating to the factual situation, as presented 
by Bador). This time, it is the implicated full obverse 
which provides the principal resource for reasoning. 
Bador asserts that the thief is one of Wenamun’s 
people; counterpart matching allows for the insertion 
of that characterization of the thief into the implicated 
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full obverse conditional relationship and, by modus 
ponens, the inference from the assertion and the impli-
cated conditional relationship, that Bador should not 
compensate Wenamun (rather he offers just to search 
for the thief, thus nicely altering Wenamun’s original 
demand to search for the money):
– (counterfac: thief belong to your 
land
> I compensate 
you)
– implic f-o: thief not belong to 
my land
> I not compen-
sate you
– statement: thief one of yours
– replacement: thief one of yours > I not compen-
sate you
– inference: I not compen-
sate you
Notice that once again, the final, rather significant 
inference that Bador should not compensate Wenamun 
remains unstated in the text but is a clear inference 
available to a rational human agent, whether ancient or 
modern, if the argument is followed through. A visual 
summary is given in Figure 2.
The final h-n counterfactual conditional discussed here 
comes from a tomb robbery response attested a number 
of times in the written record of the proceedings.
Example 3 P. BM ea 10052, 4, 13
The trumpeter Amenkhau denies involvement in 
the robberies. He asserts that ‘I didn’t see anything’, 
and then strengthens his denial with the following 
counterfactual:
h-n pt(r)i=i, wn iw=i Dd=f
If I had seen (anything), I would tell it.
By positing the counterfactual conditional that [I see] 
> [I tell it], the testimony implicates the (presented as) 
factual full obverse [I not see] > [I not tell it]. From the 
original negative assertion and from the implicated full 
obverse, by modus ponens the inference [I not tell it] 
can be drawn:
– statement: I not see
– (counterfac: I see > I tell it)
– implic f-o: I not see > I not tell it
– inference: I not tell it
In this way, via the implicated full obverse relation-
ship, the testimony links Amenkhau’s failure to tell 
anything about the robberies directly back to his asser-
tion that he didn’t see anything (he wasn’t involved in 
the robberies): he was unable to say anything for the 
reason that he didn’t see anything. A visual summary is 
given in Figure 3.
2 ir conditionals
Counterfactual meaning can also be found with both 
ir-conditionals (projective if/when type conditionals) 
and inn-conditionals (epistemic if/since type condi-
tionals). ir-conditionals ordinarily provide the basic 
forward-looking conditional in which an as-yet unre-
alized possibility is entertained and the consequences 
of that possibility posited (English grammar books 
often have examples of the form ‘If it rains tomorrow, 
the game will be cancelled’, the implicated full obverse/
alternate of which is: [not rain tomorrow] > [game not 
cancelled]; notice there may be other reasons for why 
the game may or may not go ahead, so how apposite 
the implicated full obverse is depends on context and 
how far the antecedent-event can be construed, in the 
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Fig. 3 Visual summary of Example 3.
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practicalities of the context, as a plausible exclusive 
condition for the realization of the consequent).
There are also examples of ir conditionals with a 
clear concessive or semifactual reading (‘even if ’). 
These conditionals have rather different properties 
from standard projective ir conditionals. The clearest 
examples are those with a circumstantial non-verbal 
sentence antecedent, which is more readily construed 
as a static alternate to current reality rather than as a 
dynamic prospective possibility, and thus as counter-
factual. In the context of the current paper, the feature 
of particular interest is that such concessive counter-
factual or semifactual conditionals implicate a partial 
obverse: the obverse contains the negative of the ante-
cedent, but retains the consequent in its stated form.
Example 4 P. Turin 2021, 3, 11–12
The god’s father Amenkhau has made his settlement of 
property on his new wife and on his children by his 
previous wife. His children have agreed to their father’s 
division of property. The vizier responds with a condi-
tional and then states his decision that the property will 
be divided as stated. The conditional is:
ir iw bn Hmt sAwt, iw x-r [nH]s iw mr=f sw [i]w=f dit n=s 
Axt=f, [nym i]-ir=f wsf pA iry=f
‘(Even) if it were not his wife, but a Syrian or a Nubian whom 
he loved and gave his property to, who would cancel what 
he has done?’
In semifactual cases such as this, the implicated full 
obverse delivers the wrong meaning:
– [his wife, not a Syrian or 
Nubian]
> [who would not cancel what 
he has done]
In context, the negation is singularly inappropriate in 
the consequent clause; that is, whilst the negation of the 
antecedent correctly applies to reality in the implicated 
obverse, this is not so for the consequent. Indeed the 
consequent applies in its stated form both to the stated 
counterfactual antecedent and its implicated factual 
obverse antecedent (hence the term semifactual). As 
such the correct reading is an implicated partial obverse:
– [his wife, not a Syrian or 
Nubian]
> [who would cancel what he 
has done]
As I have discussed elsewhere (Collier 2009: 15–17), in a 
conditional such as that in example 4, the antecedent is 
construed inclusively, as a member of a scalar-ordered 
set of antecedents in which the stated condition is 
treated as the pseudo-superlative limiting condition (cf. 
König 1986: 236); in this case the stated instance of the 
imagined Syrian or Nubian partner is construed as the 
pseudo-superlative limiting condition to the set which 
also includes the implicated obverse (‘factual’) condi-
tion of [his wife, not a Syrian or Nubian] (cf.  Byrne 
2005: ch. 6). The consequent applies to the antecedent 
set as a whole (see Haspelmath and König 1998: 565), 
and is thus projected across both the counterfactual 
and factual domains; that is, the imagined Syrian or 
Nubian partner is treated as something of an extreme 
example, so if the consequent (the rhetorical question) 
applies in that case, the more it should apply in the case 
of the implicated state of affairs, which is the actual case 
of the new wife. A visual summary is given in Figure 4.
So the reasoning is:
– counterfac: not his wife, but S/N > who would cancel
– implic p-o: his wife, not S/N > who would cancel
– inference: who would cancel
Essentially the vizier asks the question ‘who would 
cancel what he has done’ of the current state of affairs 
with the new wife, but rather than stating this simply, 
he strengthens the intended rhetorical force of the 
question by positing a semifactual situation in which 
a more extreme example holds than the current case, 
thus encouraging the audience to accept that if they 
take the state of affairs offered in the conditional as 
stated they should also take it in its implicated partial 
obverse.
Although the context for the following late Ramessid 
letter example is complex and not as fully clear as one 
might like, the sense of the conditional itself seems 
clear enough:
Example 5 P. Bib. Nat. 198 II (= LRL no. 46), vs. 6–7
The writer takes issue with the addressee’s anger at him 
for telling a joke about him. He tells another joke to 
reinforce his stance (but notes that, nevertheless, he is 
concerned about him). They just don’t see eye to eye:
ir iw=k m TAty, bn iw=i hAy r nAy=k skty
‘(Even) if you were vizier, I wouldn’t get into your boats.’
Once again an imagined pseudo-superlative state of 
affairs (the addressee imagined as vizier) is deployed 
as a bounding item to a scalar-ordered set of anteced-
ents, including the stated antecedent (the imagined 
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Fig. 4 Visual summary of Example 4.
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counterfact of you being vizier) and its implicated 
obverse (the actual state of affairs of you not as vizier, 
but you as you are now). The consequent applies to this 
set and thus applies both to the counterfactual ante-
cedent and to its factual implicated obverse. A visual 
summary is given in Figure 5.
Utilizing the vivid boating imagery, the writer 
seems to be using the imagined extreme case of him 
not getting into the addressee’s boats if the addressee 
were as important a figure as the vizier to implicate 
strongly that he is even less likely to be in accord with 
the addressee in the actual state of affairs.
3 inn conditionals
Finally, an example of an inn-conditional with counter-
factual meaning. Once again, as with ir-conditionals, 
the distinction between factual and counterfac-
tual conditionals is not always easy to draw, so I will 
concentrate on a single example in which the alternate-
to-reality sense seems clear enough in that the user of 
the conditional clearly does not accept the antecedent 
counterfact, and indeed is deploying this counter-
factual conditional precisely so that the recipient can 
himself recognize the conditional to be contrary-to-
fact (here based on empirical observation related to the 
consequent) and thus utilize that in his own reasoning 
(the example is discussed in more detail in Collier 
2009: 21–25).
Example 6 P. BM ea 10375 (= LRL no. 28), vs. 1
The scribe Butehamun is stressing to his lord, the 
general Piankh, that the workgang are carrying out all 
their tasks as diligently as they can, even in the face 
of problems. He reinforces this with the following 
conditional:
inn bn i-ir=n bAk n=k m ib HAty=n, iw=n hAb r dit am pAy=n 
nb
‘If we were not working for you heart and soul, then we 
would write to let our lord know.’
Butehamun entertains a situation in which the workmen 
are not working hard enough for their lord, the general 
Piankh. He posits that the consequence of this would 
be that they would inform their lord, were this the 
case (however believable or otherwise this may be). Of 
course, Butehamun is here relying on the position of 
the recipient: Piankh can have empirical observation 
(through letters) of what the workmen are telling him, 
but not direct empirical observation of what they are 
actually doing. Butehamun offers a means of linking 
these together through what the workmen (through 
Butehamun) tell the general:
– counterfac: [we work for you, not 
with heart and soul]
> [we inform you of 
not working h&s]
The implicated full obverse is (taking into account 
the scope properties of the negation in the stated 
antecedent and resolving the implicit reference in the 
consequent to what would be made known):
– Implic f-o: [we work for you, 
with heart and soul]
> [we not inform you 
of not working h&s]
The clear point is that the general can see for himself 
that the workmen are not informing him that they are 
not working for the general as fully as they can (indeed 
Butehamun has gone to great lengths to explain the 
recent overlapping history of the arrival of letters and 
how he read them out to the workmen as fast he could 
and how they assented immediately to undertaking the 
tasks set before them). As such, Piankh, if he takes the 
conditional at face value, can from observation see that 
the consequent does not hold and he can thus reason 
by modus tollens that the obverse of the antecedent as 
stated is the case: they are working for him heart and 
soul:
– (counterfac: we work for you, not 
heart and soul
> we inform you of not 
working h&s)
– implic f-o: we work for you, 
heart and soul
> we not inform you of 
not working h&s
– observation: we not inform of you 
not working h&s
– inference: we work for you, 
heart and soul
A visual summary is given in Figure 6.
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Fig. 6 Visual summary of Example 6.
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